Em 18 de setembro de 1789, referindo-se ao alcance do poder constituinte da Assembleia Nacional, Mirabeau afirmou que era preciso, nessas horas de mudança, “evitar a subitaneidade do trânsito”. Em um luminoso ensaio de 1927, consagrado ao “Orador do Povo”, José Ortega y Gasset ensina que, na ocasião, “a política de Mirabeau, como toda política autêntica, postula a unidade dos contrários. É pre-ciso, ao mesmo tempo, um impulso e um freio, uma força de acele-ração, de mudança social, e uma força (...) de contenção que impeça a vertiginosidade”. Esta definição de Ortega, que equipara a construção de um novo regime com o método da política, não só é singularmente útil para analisar as situações em que os processos de mudança não são descontínuos, onde a ruptura é de alguma maneira negociada, mas torna a nosso autor um autêntico teórico da reforma social e, por esta via, da moderação política (e da virtude, na tradição aristotélica). Não se esgota aqui, porém, o veio da moderação em Ortega. Em outra obra contemporânea da anterior, o filósofo espanhol evoca uma dimensão não menos importante dela: o tema da convivência e da conciliação. E se vale de um autor do século XIV, Ibn Khaldun, para lembrar-nos o ilusório da table rase, para que advirtamos que ainda em nossos dias toda mudança duradoura deve valer-se sempre de uma tradição longa contra uma tradição curta, que é através do retorno que se faz o novo. Parafraseando, pois, o título deste segundo ensaio, Ortega y Gasset nos revela o segredo: as chaves da mudança social em liberdade. (shrink)

El artículo busca mostrar que existe un grupo de filósofos y una filósofa en Chile que recepcionaron, tradujeron y explicaron la fenomenología de una manera más bien histórico-filológica que sistemático-problemática. Esta situación se explica, por varias razones, porque efectivamente estaban accediendo a un pensar que no tenía una larga tradición; que esas reflexiones fueron planteadas en textos originalmente en idioma alemán, lo que exigía múltiples esfuerzos de traducción; pero que también se debe a un modo de hacer filosofía en Chile, (...) más bien centrado en un canon filosófico, que en el desarrollo del pensamiento propio y original. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo expongo los aspectos principales del debate suscitado por la aparición del libro de Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez Ciencia y revolución: el marxismo de Althusser. Presentaré primero la crítica del filósofo hispanomexicano a la obra de Louis Althusser y después explicaré la contracrítica del también filósofo Enrique González Rojo que aparece en su libro Epistemología y socialismo. Por último, ofrezco una interpretación de ambos momentos que las concibe como partes de un capítulo significativo de la historia (...) de la filosofía en México.In this article I present the main points of a debate raised by the book Science and Revolution: The Marxism of Althusser by Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez. I begin by addressing the criticism of the Spanish-Mexican philosopher towards the work of Louis Althusser and then I explain the counter-criticism to this approach set forth by -the also philosopher- Enrique González Rojo in his book Epistemology and Socialism. Finally, I offer an interpretation in which both moments in the debate are conceived as a significant chapter in the history of philosophy in Mexico. (shrink)

Se revisan las nociones de teoría que han ofrecido dos importantes corrientes dentro de la filosofía de la ciencia: las concepciones sintáctica y semántica de las teorías. En tal sentido, el presente recorrido crítico de la literatura especializada centra su atención en la dimensión sincrónica de las teorías y aborda qué son las teorías científicas, cómo se caracterizan y cuál es su relación con la realidad, con base en el análisis estático de estas; además, ofrece una aproximación al estado actual (...) de la discusión. -/- The notions of theory that have offered two important currents within the philosophy of science are reviewed, namely, the syntactic and semantic conception of theories. In this sense, this critical journey of specialized literature on the synchronous dimension of theories and addresses what scientific theories are, how they are characterized and what their relationship is with reality, based on static analysis of the same, giving, in addition, a brief approach to the current state of the discussion. (shrink)

This chapter argues that from a particularly weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location, it follows that it is possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of space-time fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. The chapter suggests, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of no less unappealing alternatives. It also discusses a few ways in which their possibility (...) is relevant to various important debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

I argue that from a very weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location it follows that it's possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of spacetime fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. I defend, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of equally radical alternatives. I also discuss a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various (...) debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

Esta obra se abre con una introducción histórica, no heleno ni eurocéntrica, en la que se reinterpretan los sistemas éticos en la historia mundial, hasta situar la problemática en la Modernidad dentro del sistema-mundo como proceso de globalización que simultáneamente excluye a la mayoría de la humanidad. En la primera parte se aborda una crítica a las morales formales (Kant, Rawls, Apel, Habermas) desde un principio material o de contenido con pretensión de universalidad; el deber de producir, reproducir y desarrollar (...) la vida humana en comunidad. El principio de factibilidad ética, por su parte, permite que el cumplimiento del acto, institución o sistema de eticidad pueda tener la pretensión de bondad. En la segunda parte, desde la imposibilidad de que dicho acto, institución o sistema de eticidad «buenos» pueda tener pretensión de perfección acabada, se descubren los que «sufren» en su corporalidad vulnerable la imposibilidad de vivir, el hecho de ser excluidos. Se trata de las víctimas, al decir de Marx, Horkheimer, Benjamin, Nietzsche, Freud o Lévinas. Desde las víctimas comienza propiamente el discurso de la Ética de la Liberación, en su nivel negativo material (deben poder vivir), en el principio discursivo crítico (deben poder participar en la argumentación), todo lo cual culmina en el principio crítico negativo de la factibilidad: el principio-liberación que inspira las transformaciones con pretensión de justicia. (shrink)

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

The aim of this paper is to explore the peculiar case of infectious logics, a group of systems obtained generalizing the semantic behavior characteristic of the -fragment of the logics of nonsense, such as the ones due to Bochvar and Halldén, among others. Here, we extend these logics with classical negations, and we furthermore show that some of these extended systems can be properly regarded as logics of formal inconsistency and logics of formal undeterminedness.

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

El objetivo de este estudio es elaborar una síntesis rigurosa y actualizada sobre la educación y la igualdad de género en el ámbito académico. Para ello, se lleva a cabo un análisis bibliométrico orientado a evaluar de forma objetiva y cuantificable el estado de la literatura sobre estos dos aspectos. El período objeto de estudio engloba 11 años, dado que se inicia el 1 de enero de 2011 y finaliza el 31 de diciembre de 2021. De este modo, el análisis (...) incluye un período de cinco años, antes y después de 2016, considerado como el inicio oficial de la Agenda 2030.Los resultados preliminares muestran que la investigación sobre educación e igualdad de género se ha trasladado desde el ámbito norteamericano hasta territorio asiático. Se confirma la importancia del tema debido al elevado número de estudios subvencionados por entidades públicas y privadas. (shrink)

Identity has been widely understood in Western societies as a specular construction that operates simultaneously both from within and from outside oneself. However, this process is fiercely changing in a world in which almost every human action is mediated by information and communication technologies. This paper, from a theoretical perspective, aims to discover the main educational implications of this change. For that purpose, we first consider the traditional meaning and process of forming the self in Western culture. Afterwards, we identify (...) and describe the mechanisms for the construction of the self in our current context, highlighting the fact that technologies, in themselves and regardless of the use we make of them, hide implications. Taking this into account, we show to what extent the current development of the self presents shades, conflicts and tangible risks from an educational perspective. We finally conclude that it is essential to promote an education on technology that goes beyond the use regulation in which, up to now, it has been solely focused on. (shrink)

Waiting has traditionally been defined as the interval of time between the anticipation of an event and its occurrence. From an educational perspective, we usually believe that it is not the wait that is important, but the attitude of the individual who is waiting. It is for this reason that, while we can barely find any educational research that addresses waiting, there is a prolific production relating to hope; that is, relating to one of the possible attitudes that someone may (...) have while waiting. This paper, contrary to this trend, aims to highlight, on the one hand, the educational importance that waiting has in itself and, on the other hand, the need to take it into account before addressing any attitude that an individual may show in relation to it. To do this, we will first distinguish between two different ways of waiting, one in which the individual is aware of the objective of the wait and another in which they are not aware of any objective. Secondly, we will analyze each of them separately and point out to what extent our world today is trying to force us to reduce our experience to just one of them. Finally, we will conclude that there is an educational need to experience both if we want to educate open minds capable of dealing with hope-inspiring attitudes in different ways. (shrink)

This study aims at showing how at the basis of Nikolai Berdyaev’s criticism of capitalism and Marxism lays the concept of Imago Dei. The Russian religious philosopher puts forward the Imago Dei as fundamental to the Christian understanding of human dignity. Berdyaev believes that in both capitalism and Marxism an objectification of the person takes place, and therefore a denial of basic human dignity. Berdyaev’s criticism of capitalism refers to its internal principles, partly building on Marx’s early criticism of capitalism. (...) Although he shared some of the same concerns with Marx and other Marxist theorists, ultimately his was a critique from a Christian perspective that was deeply humanistic, whereas Marxism in its Hegelian orientation had failed in achieving what Berdyaev understands as true humanism. Having confronted and engaged both systems of thought during his own life, Berdyaev’s insights are most interesting, and I argue in this paper that they are also relevant for our own reflections on these subjects today. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

Este artículo busca responder si es posible planificar y reflexionar sobre contenidos transversales en educación, sin una aproximación transdisciplinaria sobre la complejidad de lo real, en un contexto de mutación planetaria. Todos los esfuerzos, dice el autor, parten del mismo diagnóstico: los distintos niveles educativos se encuentran obsoletos, se requiere una mirada transdisciplinar, y los docentes no tienen una epistemología acorde. El artículo analiza los estados de avance y las distinciones entre multidisciplinariedad, interdisciplinariedad y transdisciplinariedad.

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)